Europe as a Multiple Modernity
Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging

Edited by

Martina Topić and Srdjan Sremac

CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS PUBLISHING
CONTENTS

Preface .................................................................................................................. viii
R. Ruard Ganzevoort

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... xi

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
Europe as a Multiple Modernity
Martina Topić and Srdjan Sremac

Part I: Europe after the Holocaust

Chapter One ....................................................................................................... 22
European Identity and Religion: Identity, Alterity or Plurality?
Bérengère Massignon

Chapter Two ...................................................................................................... 35
A European Intifada? On the New Form of an Old European Anti-Semitism in a New Millennium
Martina Topić

Part II: Religion in National Debates

Chapter Three .................................................................................................. 72
“Adjusting Frequencies”: Negotiating Belonging among Young Kurds in Finland
Mari Toivanen

Chapter Four .................................................................................................... 92
Religion in Education: The Faith School Debates in Contemporary Britain
Atsuko Ichijo

Chapter Five ................................................................................................... 109
The Place of Religion in Education in France
Géraldine Bozec
Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 126
*Imam Hatip* Schools: Symbolic Fault Lines of the Religious-Secular Divide in Turkey
Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 149
Young Muslims in The Netherlands in Focus: Understanding Tariq Ramadan
Mohammed Hashas and Jan Jaap de Ruiter

Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 194
Religion and National Identity in Greece: The Identity Card Crisis and the Islamic Mosque Issue
Alexandros Sakellariou

**Part III: Religious Identities in Everyday Life**

Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 214
Brazilian Undocumented Migrants and Their Choice of Pentecostalism in The Netherlands
Rangel de Oliveira Medeiros

Chapter Ten............................................................................................. 228
Roma and Conversion to Protestantism: An Example of Southeast Serbia
Dragan Todorović

Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 252
National Identities and Internal Boundaries: An Ethnographic Approach to the Religious Issue in Sweden
Emir Mahieddin

Chapter Twelve ........................................................................................ 274
Estonian Women’s Identity after Conversion to Islam
Age Ploom

Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 298
The Religious and National Identity of Muslim Converts in Britain
Leon Moosavi
Part IV: Religion and Identity in the Media

Chapter Fourteen ................................................................. 320
Europe’s Disputed Symbolic Boundaries: Identity, Religion
and Turkey’s EU Membership
Carlo Nardella

Chapter Fifteen ................................................................. 339
Media Representation of Serbian and Croatian Identities;
Selected Examples from the Serbian Kurir and the BBC
Violeta Cvetkovska-Ocokoljic, Srdjan Sremac and Tatjana Cvetkovski

Concluding Remarks ......................................................... 358
Are Contested Identities in the Public Sphere Sacred or Secular?
Srdjan Sremac and Martina Topić

Contributors ........................................................................... 362
The project “Europe” has never been without challenges, but one could say that ours is a time of exceptional demand. The economic and financial crisis is but one of the fundamental threats to the whole notion of European unity. Another is the fact that the raison d’être of European unity, until recently, was founded on the horrific history of WWII. *Nie wieder Krieg*—“never again war”—served as a compelling argument for several decades, but this formula slowly but surely lost its convincing power when peace became a taken-for-granted reality. We have to redefine and renegotiate the values and merits of working toward one united Europe, regardless of the specific legal and political structure it might obtain. In doing so, our issues are no longer found within the European sphere only, but in geopolitical relations especially. On a global scale, Europe may continue to be one of the key players, but probably only when it finds ways of overcoming its internal tensions and building a shared purpose and identity. The present crises, thus, request a renewed search for the “soul of Europe.”

One should not be mistaken, however. The soul of Europe is not a monolithic entity, and there is no simple way to define it. European identity is a plural concept. This has probably always been the case, but it is clearly the nature of our present situation. Even modernity is not a well-defined phenomenon, but a series of pathways of change. Similarly, European modernity should not be reduced to one specific type, recurring traits notwithstanding. The ways in which modern European societies and identities are construed differ from country to country and from time to time, and even within one society we can find highly variegated modes and models. Conflict is always right around the corner. Add religion and the picture becomes even more complex. Personal identities are construed at the intersections of nationality, ethnicity, religion, family, and much more. One’s position in each of these arenas, in the centre or at the

---

1 Member of the Upper Chamber of the Dutch Parliament for the Greens (*GroenLinks*), and Professor of Practical Theology at VU University Amsterdam.
Europe as a Multiple Modernity

margins, largely defines how the identity elements are negotiated. But like the other sources, religion appears with myriad faces. Sometimes it serves to bolster a specific national identity, while at others it helps to bridge two or more identities and overcome tensions. In the end, this diversity requires us to study how individuals and groups navigate complexities to create a world identity they can live in. The soul of Europe can be understood only if we start by understanding the soul of Europeans. The present volume offers precisely this kind of study.

Acting in a dual role as a theologian and politician, I am grateful to researchers and editors for bringing together this rich material. As an empirical theologian I am encouraged once more to not look at religious traditions and official doctrines in order to understand the role and meaning of religion in contemporary society. Religion is found at the crossroads of identity struggles, politics and ordinary life. It cannot be distinguished entirely from other elements of culture, nor reduced to them. Additionally, more than in previous eras individuals identify as belonging to two or more religious traditions. It is precisely these complexities that make religion so interesting for a theologian. It would be very meaningful to interpret the material offered here to answer the question of what is sacred to people and how the relation with that “sacred” impacts on their life, identity construction, and social and political choices.

As a politician my main interest lies in how all these identity issues affect the development of sustainable societies on the local, national, European, and global levels. It seems fair to say that religious/ethnic/national identities are important contributors to societal cohesion, but that they also fuel many conflicts. This should come as no surprise for anyone who knows a little history or sociological theory. Different, though, in post-secular Europe is the deinstitutionalized, globalized and mediatized nature of contemporary religion. This means that we are dealing now with much more fluid shapes of religion and unexpected actors governing the field. As a consequence we have to rethink the church-state separation that is at the heart of modern societies. Rethink, but not abandon. If religion is still a vital force in the world—and Europe for that matter—but religious organizations are less dominant, what does that mean for our efforts of managing religious elements in our societies?

Obviously, there is a significant lack of synchronicity when it comes to the development of the religious field even within Europe. This volume testifies to the major differences between post-Christian and post-communist countries. Even in my own country, The Netherlands, the role of religion varies greatly from modern urban spaces to traditional rural areas, and from secular autochthones to more religious newcomers (both
Christian and Muslim). This lack of synchronicity also means that, in some places, the deinstitutionalization of religion has gone much further than in others and that there may also be realms of re-institutionalization.

There are different political styles and strategies to deal with all this diversity. Some opt for politics based on power exchange regarding the interests of different groups, and this is clearly part of the political process. More important to my mind is politics based on ideals and worldviews. We have to negotiate the various ideals of what the world could and should be and our visions of Europe. It is in these conversations that we will discover, or better construct, the soul of Europe.

The research presented in this volume offers many insights into the complex intersections of religion, identity and nationality. It allows us to build the kind of conversations we need for our European future. If we learn how to accommodate the multiplicity of identities and modes of belonging, then we will also build our much-needed community.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors would like to thank the contributors for accepting to work on this project. This includes authors we knew before putting this project forward, but also (perhaps even more) the authors who answered our call for papers, published at the European Sociological Association’s official mailing list.

We would also like to thank the editors of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for kind communication and assistance while putting this project forward.

We would also like to thank the reviewers for endorsing the manuscript.

Finally, this project would not be possible without proofreading. In regard to that, we owe a world to Peggy van Luyn who devoted her time to proofread the manuscript.

Martina Topić and Srdjan Sremac
INTRODUCTION¹

EUROPE AS A MULTIPLE MODERNITY

MARTINA TOPIĆ AND SRDJAN SREMAC

The current volume Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging presents a study of religious identities in Europe conducted through the analysis of fifteen case studies.

The reason for selecting these cases lies in the variety of geographical positions, as well as in a variety of historical legacies and state dominances. With this selection of cases we wanted to follow the multiple modernities theory, and show in practice (through the chapters presented in the book) how the theory works. The very essence of the theory of multiple modernities is the variety of approaches and concepts that all form modernity, although what it means to be modern varies and differs from case to case.

This book is not a definitive view on the notions of religious, European and the modern; it is rather a contribution to the ongoing debate on these issues that focuses on one aspect of the multiple modernities theory, that is the human self-reflexivity and human agency or on the sense of belonging and self-construction of identities. In that we are analysing fifteen case studies from various European countries in an attempt to understand modernity by examining religion and its influence that has been central to social sciences since Auguste Comte, and significantly entered into sociological research after Durkheim’s studies in religion (Wilson 1982; Fasnafan 2012).

Although many authors in this volume take a sociological stance in their discussions, the volume hopes to contribute to other fields in the social sciences and humanities, such as, for example, political science. If it does so, then it will fully fulfil its purpose.

¹ The title “Europe as a multiple modernity,” which is also the title of the volume as a whole, is inspired by the draft title of A. Ichijo’s volume “Europe, Nations and Modernity” (2011), originally entitled “Europe as Modernity.” The editors would like to express their gratitude to Alexandros Sakellariou for his helpful comments on the earlier draft of this introduction.
Modernity as a Concept and a Problem

The issues of religion and modernity in Europe prevail in academic debates in the social sciences. Auguste Comte ([1832–42] 1988) discussed what can be called the modernization of science by envisaging a sociology that will be rational and positive and will lead people to critically think rather than obey magic and religion.2 With this view, Comte predicted modernity; however, he did not predict leaving the modernity that some authors claim to happen as the human society entered postmodernity. Postmodernity rejected the possibility of scientific competences to fully resolve problems (Topić 2012), and modernity is considered to be the grand narrative as many, particularly postmodernists, argue (for example, see Lyotard 1984). In this view, science based on positivist assumptions clearly failed in offering answers and solutions to human problems. For example, sociological understanding of modernity consists of understanding that the modern world emerged from the European political and economic revolution that occurred due to the cultural changes from the Renaissance, Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. The discussions on divisions between pre-modern and modern are central to sociological academic inquiry up to the present (Smith 2006). Because of this, understanding modernity is seen through Europe, and Europe is seen through modernity; however, modernity theory is consequentially seen (particularly by multiple modernists, post-colonialists, structuralists and postmodernists) as Euro-centric (Bhambra 2011; Mouzelis 1999). This is mainly because modernity is seen as singular and centred on the Western Europe while the “others” are left out of the discussion, as if the modernization did not reflect upon them directly, but through the domination of the West that experienced changes from the era of modernity. These non-Western societies are evaluated according to the Western development (Eisenstadt 2000; 2002; Kaya & Tecmen 2011; Arnason 2006).

2 Comte ([1832–42] 1988) discussed three phases that human society will go through: theological, metaphysical and positivist. In the first, the human spirit believes in forces that are equal to people and the human spirit is still in childhood in terms of its development. Abstract forces such as nature characterize the second, metaphysical phase, and this is religiously founded. The third phase is characterized by the human shift toward positivism, and this means knowing its nature. This phase is also a phase when sociology will become positive and objective (see also Fiamengo 1987; Knoblauch 2004; Haralambos & Holborn 2002).
Modernity is generally understood as a turning point when humans turned toward faith in science and technology, human development, industrialization and faith in the rational as competent to solve problems. Modernity also means objectivity of academic research, that modernity embraces the positivist assumptions founded by Comte, according to which academic research should rely on direct, objective observations rather than conditions that cannot be directly observed, such as emotions and feelings (Haralambos & Holborn 2002).

According to Giddens (1991), Beck (1986) and Bauman (2001), the emergence of modernity has changed every-day life since it questions tradition, and this has opened a space for the creation of new identities. Therefore, not only institutions and politics changed, but everyday life as a whole has changed. Giddens (1991) believes that because of detachment from tradition societies faced fragmentation and pluralism of action that brought about the condition of reflexive modernity that, consequentially, caused reflexive identities. Giddens (1991) understands this situation as a late modernity.

On the other hand, some have argued that modernity as a concept has been seen in Europe every time the “consciousness of a new epoch formed itself through a renewed relationship to the ancients-whenever, moreover, antiquity was considered a model to be recovered through some kind of imitation” (Habermas 1983, 4). The idea of being modern in this view “changed with the belief, inspired by modern science, in the infinite progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral betterment” (Ibid.).

When it comes to sociology, the issue for the analysis has been centred on the “processes of economic growth, differentiation, rationalization, individualization, urbanization, and so on, as central dynamics of a theorized process of modernization. Anthropology, likewise, was defined as a discipline per se, until near the end of the last Century, by the very constitutive idea of the existence and interest of ‘traditional,’ pre-modern tribes, societies, and cultures—in contrast to the societies of modernity” (Smith 2006, 1).

The questions that the opponents of European modernization theory posed are the questions of a plurality in considering modernization in Europe and elsewhere, but also of the positivist nature of the European singular modernity. This is related to the explanatory possibility that is one-sided in its positivist nature while the opponents advocate “reflexivity, deconstruction, and interpretation, and with arguments for the necessary demise of grand narratives” (Bhambra 2011, 654).
Two central concepts challenged the modernity theory. Bhambra recognized these concepts as the “third wave cultural historical sociology” and the “multiple modernities paradigm” (2011, 654). The first concept is making an attempt to historicize modernity and the way it is understood by examining the complex history that constitutes modern social transformations, while the multiple modernities concept includes in its analysis other histories assuming modernity in plural and not just in singular.

**Theory of Multiple Modernities**

Because of the apparent failure of grand narratives or of the large modernization theory that promised to give answers with its positive character, in which it clearly failed, a new theory has emerged. The theory of multiple modernities offered by Israeli sociologist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt advocated by some academics dealing with this issue (e.g. Spohn 2009; 2001) offers a different view that presents removal from the positivist and exclusivist nature of the modernity theory.

The theory of multiple modernities developed as a “civilisational analysis employed by scholars of comparative sociology and historical sociology in their attempt to understand the patterns of development of modernity, as well as the relationship between the West and the East” (Boldt et al. 2009, 9). The multiple modernities theory is seen as an opponent to the modernization theory because the former argues that we must consider modernity in plural and refuse to differentiate West from the East, or we should stop looking from West to East to explain what happened because this is Euro-centric. Europe is, in this view, seen as one constitutive element of modernity, but modernity that is seen in a plurality of different developments and modernizations (Bhambra 2011; Martinelli 2007; Boldt et al. 2009). With this, Europe can be interpreted as a multiple modernity, and these multiple modernities constitute one great European modernity.

Europe is, however, as Bhambra (2011) argues, taken as a reference point for examining alternative modernities since European origins of modernity cannot be denied. The method of multiple modernists is then a comparative, historical sociology that typically defends this theory by showing different development paths. This theory argues that we can identify modernity paths in every European country just that these development paths do not necessarily follow the Western path, nor do they have to do so (Eisenstadt 2000; 2001; 2005; 2005a; Delanty 2006; Arnason 2006). In this view, the difference does not actually make a
difference to modernity in its original form (see Bhambra, 2011, 655), and modernity therefore presents a multiplicity of political and cultural programs (Eisenstadt 2000; 2001; 2005; Delanty 2006; Arnason 2006; Martínez 2007; Kaya & Tecmen 2011).

The theory of multiple modernities constitutes different collective identities (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995), and these identities are then subject to negotiation and re-negotiation (Eisenstadt 2000). This means that Eisenstadt sees the concept of multiple modernities through the vision of the contemporary world as a “story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programmes” (2000, 2). Actions are in this vision taken by social actors that have different views on what modernity means in the society. In this sense, modernity cannot be considered through a prism of the West only (Eisenstadt 2002), because actions that are undertaken are different from one society to another, and what constitutes modernity is, thus, different (Eisenstadt 2000). Part of the modernity programs are often protests and rebellions, and these movements aim towards the creation of an active participatory society that will be compact in its actions (i.e. it will also include its periphery). Modernity also means emancipation, equality, freedom, justice, autonomy, solidarity, identity and a term that Eisenstadt (2002) calls “sovereignty of reason.”

Modernity is inevitably connected with conflict between the traditional society that denies modernity as a term and the West as its core, and modern society that enforces rationalism and the enlightenment, or: “in other words, it is possible for different societies and subcultures to be truly modern and yet not end up looking like, say, France or Sweden with regard to religion, culture, morality, and views of science and metaphysics” (Smith 2006, 2).

The theory of multiple modernities, according to Eisenstadt (2000), goes against the theory of modernity enforced by sociologists such as, for example, Marx, Durkheim and Weber, in that all theories of modernity assumed that the “cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world” (Eisenstadt 2000, 1).

Modernity as a concept developed in the West and contested by the theory of multiple modernities included “distinct ideological as well as institutional premises” (Eisenstadt 2000, 3) in that it developed reflexivity “around basic ontological premises of structure of social and political authority—a reflexivity shared even by modernity’s most radical critics,
who in principle denied its validity” (Ibid.). Modernity as a cultural program entailed the autonomy of a man and a removal from traditional political and cultural autonomy. This modernity then brings strong emphasis on autonomous participation of societal members in the society in terms of constituting social and political order. This would also include free access of the societal members to these orders (Eisenstadt 2000).

Becoming modern, as already noted, also means being detached from the magic where religion also fits in, and this is due to the irrationality of magic and, thus, religion as well. Being modern thus means being rational and critical, and this would then also mean being detached from the traditional. The theory of multiple modernities argues that there is an apparent lack of explanatory power in this conventional approach, and outlines that the most salient aspect of modernity is the centrality of human agency and human reflexive nature and self-criticism. This means that being modern means being a self-reflective agent, and this is particularly convenient for researching identities. Eisenstadt (2000; 2001) in this sense advocates the “intensive reflexivity” and the “autonomy of man.” Human agency and reflexivity also imply, as Eisenstadt argues, interpretation and re-interpretations of social reality, and this brings about a multiplicity of visions of the modern world and autonomy. The latter means that individuals actively participate in: “constitution of the social and political order, while also producing conflicts between different agents. Modernity is, therefore, also characterized by antinomies that emerge in the confrontation between different interpretations of freedom vs. control, in the contestation between different religious movements, through the conflict between different groups of social actors” (Boldt et al. 2009, 11).

**Religion and Modernity**

Religion and modernity are inextricably linked to each other, for modernity is seen as directly opposite to the religious. However, consensus has never been reached on who is modern and what it exactly means to be modern, and especially not when religion and religious identity are concerned. Sociological theories:

… believed that modernity was unavoidably destructive of religion, belief in spiritual realities and objective universals, non-naturalistic metaphysics, and “traditional” cultures and perspectives generally. Modernity always contained acids that are necessarily secularizing, disenchancing, and fostering of a naturalistic and materialist outlook. By theoretical definition, religious faith and belief in such things as natural laws became cognitively
Europe as a Multiple Modernity

deviant, and were expected certainly to fade away with the progress of time and the advance of modernity.3

(Smith 2006, 1)

Because of the dominance of the modernity theory, religion has often been discussed through secularization theory. Casanova (2006, 7) distinguishes three connotations of secularisation or secularisation as “the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern societies, often postulated as a universal, human, developmental process,” and this aspect is the most commonly debated. On the other hand, secularization can be understood as “the privatization of religion, often understood both as a general modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics.” Finally, secularization can be understood as “the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as ‘emancipation’ from religious institutions and norms.” This last concept is, as Casanova (2006, 7) points out, a “core component of the classic theories of secularization, which is related to the original etymological-historical meaning of the term within medieval Christendom.”

European sociologists tend to see secularization as the decline of religious beliefs, and consequentially as a decline in the significance and power of religion in both society and with individual beliefs, and these concepts are related to the general process of modernization (Casanova 2006; Bruce 2002; Hefner 1998). In Europe this is of particular relevance for there is no agreement on the secularity and meaning of religion here. For example, Davie (2000; 1994) states that the relationship between Europe and religion can best be characterized by “believing without belonging,” while Hervieu-Léger (2004, quoted in Casanova 2006) states that it is quite the opposite, and that the European situation is “belonging without believing.” This means that in the first sense Europeans are believers without actually belonging to institutional Churches, because of which the participation in institutionalized worship decreased. In the other case, it means that Europeans officially belong to institutional churches for they are officially declared as believers, but they do not truly believe or cherish their religion, nor actively participate in worshiping.

Europe is seen through the decline of religious activities and religious worshipping, and the process of secularization is linked with the process of modernization. If looking to Europe as opposed to the USA then it appears

3 Durkheim (2001) understood religion through the notion of the society. In Durkheim’s view society is the true force of religion because all religious activities come from the society (see also Knoblauch 2004; Topić 2012).
that Americans are profoundly more religious and religiously affiliated than the Europeans; however, America cannot be called less modern because of it (Berger 2001; Casanova 2006; Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Europe is, on the other hand, more secularized than the USA, but this does not mean that its identity is freed from religion for it is based on Christian identity, and this applies even to the most secularized western European societies (Spohn 2003, 282).

Peter L. Berger, a former advocate of secularization and modernization theory, withdrew from advocating the former, claiming it simply does not work because the relationship between religion and modernity is by far too complex and, thus, the decline of religious beliefs (Berger 1999). Berger argues that not only has secularization failed, and that societies are not facing a decline in religious beliefs, but on the contrary: “religious communities have survived and even flourished to the degree that they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world. To put it simply, experiments with secularized religion have generally failed; religious movements with beliefs and practices dripping with reactionary supernaturalism (the kind utterly beyond the pale at self-respecting faculty parties) have widely succeeded” (1999, 4).

Secularization is, for Berger (2001, 1):

... a process in which religion diminishes in importance both in society and in the consciousness of individuals. And most sociologists looking at this phenomenon have shared the view that secularization is the direct result of modernization. Put simply, the idea has been that the relation between religion and modernity is inverse—the more of the former, the less of the latter. Different reasons have been put forward for this relation. Most often it was ascribed to the ascendancy of modern scientific thinking, making the world more rationally comprehensible and manageable, and thus, supposedly, leaving less and less space for the supernatural.

Casanova (2006, 13) points out that the theory of multiple modernities—because it advocates the existence of certain traits that are shared by all societies, but that these traits do not necessarily mean that everything has to be shared and equal—puts the emphasis “on the relevance of cultural traditions and world religions for the formation of multiple modernities.” In this, the theory of multiple modernities takes religion as an issue that can be researched to question modernities and does not necessarily reject a certain level of religiosity as pre-modern or traditional, but it questions the development of religious beliefs and analyses them inside a multiple modernity theory. The multiple modernities theory, therefore, does not
necessarily insist on secularisation. As Spohn argues, the theory of multiple modernities: “presupposed that western modernity is only one among other types of modernity evolving in the various civilizations of the world. The concept of multiple modernity thereby assumes that traditions are not simply dissolved by modernization or globalization, but rather that particularly religious and imperial traditions remain constitutive dimensions of modern societies” (2003, 268).

Eisenstadt (1994; 1999; 1999a; 2000), as a main advocate of the theory of multiple modernities, argues that religious traditions are reconstructed regardless of the secularization process and that religion as such remains a constitutive basis in all societies. This view is also in line with criticism of the secularisation theory in the Sociology of Religion (Bruce 1992; Casanova 1994).

If looking from the comparative multiple modernities perspective, Europe can be explained through multiple political, socio-economic, religious and cultural programs, as well as diverse religious and cultural lives that exist in different forms in different countries (Eisenstadt 1987; Spohn 2009). On the other hand, European secularization should be seen through multiple modernities because European collective identities “are not simply secular or post-secular but consist of multiple religious, as well as secular components” (Spohn 2009, 361, see also Martin 2005; Casanova 1994; Davie 2000; 1994). As Eisenstadt (2000; 2003) argues, secularization has often been followed by the sacralization of the collective identities, such as the state, the nation or the people.

**Scope of this Volume**

In this book we understand modernity through all the elements it normally entails, as explained above; however, we particularly explore the individual projections of religious identities. In this we are exploring modernity through human self-reflexivity and agency with an attempt to explain the variety of discourses humans are situated within, and to see whether and how they distinguish the religious from the everyday, be it national, European or personal. With self-reflexivity we mean religious attitudes and the possibility of people in Europe to organize their lives as a multiplicity of identities and the negotiation and re-negotiation of identities in everyday life, as argued by Eisenstadt. This means that we are exploring human identities and the organization of the everyday life through questioning what role religion plays in it, and whether religious identities can be incorporated in the everyday, “modern” life. Additionally, the founding concept of the book is the assumption that Europe can be
analysed in terms of its distinctive development paths, and in this we agree with Eisenstadt on the Euro-centrism of the classical modernity theory. Contrary to the classical modernity theory we believe that all European countries can be put into one analysis, and that Europe can be considered as “a multiple modernity.”

Our starting position is the classical position of the Sociology of religion, according to which religion plays a pivotal role in everyday life and motivates human action. However, we are exploring how this works in practice, in present Europe, and how European citizens, be they native or newcomers, self-reflect on religion. Human self-reflexivity can also mean the possibility of rational and independent thinking and understanding of the world. In this latter view, human self-reflexivity means people are able to independently observe the world and differentiate it from the religious, as well as to detach from its influences. In this humans are able to be modern and religious, and faithful and critical, at the same time.

This volume is divided in three sections. The first is entitled “Europe after the Holocaust” and contains two chapters. The role of these two chapters is to provide an insight into the notions of alterity and plurality in Europe after the Holocaust with the intention to open a discussion on Europe, and the ongoing debates on the notion of the religious.

The first chapter, written by B. Massignon, discusses the plurality of religious positions in the EU. By arguing that the EU gave up enforcing the Christian roots of Europe in favour of the plurality of religions, it appears that the EU actually gave up enforcing alterity and one-sided views on who is and what it means to be European. This policy does not exclude religious beliefs, but “transforms the ways in which religious belief is publicly expressed.” In this way, European identity is inclusive of pluralism and religious and human rights and religious groups contribute to the definition of a European identity, but they do not define the European norms. This means that the EU is accepting the multiplicity of religions in Europe and that the founding decision of the EU Constitution relies on the assumption of multiplicity and plurality, and furthermore this means that the European identity has been re-interpreted in favour of the human agency and reflexivity of the decision makers. The EU policy in terms of religion is, thus, founded on the multiplicity assumption and Europe is, with this policy, making an attempt to detach itself from the horror of one-sided projections of alterity enforced during World War II.

Contrary to the first chapter, the second, written by M. Topić, discusses the re-emergence of Anti-Semitism in Europe, with an example from France. The chapter shows how European politics work the other way around if the politics towards World War II are reinterpreted and
renegotiated. The chapter discusses how new discourses on Anti-Semitism are constructed and negotiated, and how people reflect on them. In this, the chapter also analyses Muslim and Jewish positions in France, and the situation clearly shows how religion motivates human action, since Anti-Semitism largely relies on religious stereotypes that have existed for more than 2,000 years. However, old stereotypes have been re-negotiated and used in a new form, and this re-negotiation constitutes a new reality in Europe. This new reality exists in parallel with the EU’s framework of plurality and inclusivity.

The second part of the book is entitled “Religion in National Debates” and encompasses six chapters. The role of this part is to show how identities are negotiated and renegotiated in various countries that, although different in terms of their development, still face similar problems and have similar national debates.

In the first chapter M. Toivanen analyses multiple identities of the Kurdish youth in Finland. It appears that young Kurds hold multiple identities as Kurds, Finnish citizens, new Finns and foreigners. As Finnish citizens they are trying to integrate and live Finnish lives, but at the same time they are trying to meet the expectations of their Kurdish community. However, being a Finn is not an option for they are not Finns, but at the same time they are neither fully Kurdish either since they are integrated in the Finnish society. Being a Kurd in Finland is thus associated with being a Muslim, while, in reality, Kurds are “modern” Muslims, or they are trying to become so while at the same time hiding their “modern” attitudes from their traditional families. Furthermore, being a Kurd is more about culture than religion, and this is contested by young Kurds because their fellows Finns do not correctly understand this. In this situation, young Kurds are interpreting and reinterpreting their identities and a sense of belonging through multiple identities associated with their religious and ethnic identification, the discourse of inclusion and exclusion, and the position of “Other” in Finnish society. European identity also appears in their sense of belonging and construction of their distinctive identities because young Kurds tend to identify with the civic European identity expressed through citizenship status, but not with a European cultural identity that they see through the birthrights they do not hold. The lack of an appropriate homeland, for Kurds have no state, also causes difficulties for their position because of which their “Finnishness” as well as their “Kurdishness” is constantly being re-negotiated.

A. Ichijo, who analysed the faith school debates in the United Kingdom, wrote the next chapter. Ichijo tries to make sense of how religion and religious education are understood by various individuals in
Britain. The faith school debate in the UK proved to be centred on the issue of whether religion should be included in the education system, and consequentially what the role and position of religion in the education system and the society is or should be. Representatives of various religious denominations see faith schools as a parental choice where parents should be independent in deciding whether they want their children to attend religious schools. This view is shared by some minority representatives who believe that faith schools should be their own choice due to the fact that the UK has an official religion, but everyone has to pay taxes. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that faith schools are an obstacle to integration and understanding of each other and the diversity that British society represents. With this discussion we see multiple identities emerging in one multicultural society. Because the state has a liberal and multicultural policy, a debate on the faith schools and their integrative aspect has emerged, and a variety of positions are being undertaken by a variety of factors, which self-reflect on their own role and position in the society, in both wide and narrow senses.

G. Bozéc analyses the same issue as A. Ichijo in her chapter, i.e. the position of religion in education in regard to the headscarf issue in France. Education has been a central battlefield in France since the French Republic, but this time the question is centred on the interplay between religion and identity, and the national as well as European. Through the qualitative analysis of discourses present within the civil society, the chapter reveals conflicting views on the meanings of the nation and Europe and the place of the religious dimension within national and European frameworks. The predominant discourse is the distrust of religion that is now intertwined with the issues of immigration and integration. Whether the state would fund private schools run by religious denominations became a subject of national discussion where certain individuals or minority representatives, as in the British case, claimed that the school should be a parental choice, thus arguing for the existence of public schools run by religious denominations. However, the headscarf issue has recently become the central issue, meaning that the place of Islam is now highly contested in French society, and in particular within discussions on the place of religion in education. Discourses emphasize the importance of national cohesion and unity, and there is a clear denial of subgroups within the national public sphere. Religion is here seen as a threat to individual autonomy. Discourses surrounding the French case clearly demonstrate how various actors self-reflect on their own position in society and their religious identities.
The next chapter, written by A. Kaya and A. Tecmen, deals with the Imam Hatip schools in Turkey. As the chapter suggests, Turkey is often treated as the European “other” due to its Muslim majority; however, debates on the role of religion in the public space, in an officially secular Turkey, are something that rules both academic and public discourse. By juxtaposing the official discourse of using religion and secularism to control the people, the discourse of the religious denomination to impose Imam Hatip schools from the early age (through middle school education and not during the high school) and civil society discourse, the chapter shows the various positions that the individuals and representatives undertake in Turkey on this matter. Debates on Imam Hatip schools illustrate divisions on the religious-secular divide in Turkey, as well as a social divide between moderate Islamists and secular fundamentalists, which can be perceived as a by-product of modernization. The debates on religious education and the role and position of religion in the society are then related to Europeanization seen as a synonym for modernization. In the Turkish case, modernization/Europeanization are associated with secularism and rationalism, but at the same time modernization represents an ongoing process that relies on social contestations and tensions. Because of the instrumentalism of religion in Turkey, actors take a different position and express different views divided on the lines between secularization and Islamisation, and this comes as a consequence of state dominance. At the same time the Turkish example demonstrates that Turkey is also faced with the same debates as Western societies, although it is a country often discussed as “other,” which confirms our multiple modernities concept, arguing that what it means to be modern differs from case to case.

The following chapter is co-written by M. Hashas and J. J. de Ruiter and discusses the position of young Muslims in The Netherlands in regard to Tariq Ramadan’s theory that envisages a European Islam proposing an idea that Muslims can be Muslims and Westerners at the same time, or that values of the host Western society can be lived and respected while at the same time preserving Islam. In their study, Hashas & de Ruiter explore the attitudes and self-reflection of young Muslims in The Netherlands, a country that has for a long time been a destination for migrants, and a country with a large Muslim population that has brought controversies regarding the aspect of integration. The study shows that young Dutch Muslims still have difficulties with accepting loyalty to the country in which they live, as Ramadan suggests. At the same time, respondents revealed moderate attitudes on wearing the hijab that they think should be optional and not mandatory, and that woman should be given equal rights.
On some other issues that are often contested in the West, respondents also expressed positive attitudes and, therefore, this study suggests that young Dutch Muslims tend toward accepting liberal Islam. However, at the same time they do not fully understand it and a way toward acceptance is still open. Moreover, this study clearly shows the self-reflection of respondents who critically observe the world, and reflect on their own lives.

A. Sakellariou analyses religion and national identity in Greece in the following chapter, in which he emphasises the identity card crisis and the Islamic mosque issue. The subject of this chapter is to study the relationship between religion and national identity in Greek society within the European context, demonstrating the discourses surrounding these two debates. In the first case the EU requested the removal of religious affiliation from the ID card. This caused a reaction from the Greek Orthodox Church that insists on the link between national and religious affiliation in Greece. An issue with the building of a mosque in Athens also caused a serious debate because the Greek Orthodox Church demonstrated its unwillingness to accept the visibility of other denominations and their places of worship in public spaces. The Greek Orthodox Church demonstrated their willingness to respect the Constitutional right to belong to any faith as long as this was not visible to the public since what is visible clearly has to be Christian. The EU, which funds the Greek Orthodox Church in some aspects, is seen as jeopardizing the Greek identity with its multicultural and secular policies. However, at the same time the Greek Orthodox Church insists that Europe is Christian, something that Europe itself denied when Christianity was removed from the European Constitution. Greek discourses on these two issues reveal the fear of the Church losing its strength in the Greek society if Greek society becomes more multicultural. At the same time, discourses reveal the apparent failure of the secularisation theory due to the strength of the Church in stopping integration and efforts for peaceful co-existence, in which the Church has the support from the public. Even though Greece is often considered one of the core European countries due to its rich history and old civilisation, this chapter makes us question whether Greece is modern.

The third part is entitled “Religious Identities in Everyday Life” and encompasses five chapters. The first is written by R. de Oliveira Medeiros who, using his own experience in living in The Netherlands, discusses attitudes of undocumented Brazilian migrants in The Netherlands and their sense of belonging. Brazilian undocumented migrants face difficult conditions upon their arrival in The Netherlands; however, going to Church gives them a sense of belonging due to the fact that they can meet
fellow Brazilians and speak their own language there. The usual Brazilian social structure and social order disappear here and migrants are faced with a different system and different life habits, and are therefore forced to adjust to the new conditions. At the same time, a new concept and understanding of what is right and what is wrong, in terms of religion, emerges. Drawing from Freston’s (2008) findings, this chapter argues that there is also a Theology of the undocumented in The Netherlands. This chapter demonstrates the dominance of the state where people, due to the influence from society, are surrounded with change to their social structure and behaviour, as well as having to renegotiate their sense of belonging and their identities. Just like the Dutch Muslims, as presented in the previous section in the chapter on The Netherlands, Brazilian migrants are negotiating and reinterpreting their identities in a (liberal) Dutch society.

D. Todorović is responsible for the next chapter wherein he analyses the position of Roma citizens in southeast Serbia who have converted to various faiths, but mostly to Evangelicalism, and their self-reflection on everyday life and religious identities. The life conditions of the Roma population have improved and transformed their relationships, resulting in refraining from antisocial behaviour, completing elementary school and the continuation of secondary education, marrying after reaching a more adult age, etc. The Protestantization, or more precisely Evangelicalism, has also brought emancipation in terms of customs they use to cherish, and in that they have modernized their ways of worshiping. This chapter, through the discourse analysis and in-depth interviews, provides a view on the modernising aspect of religious conversions and the reflective attitudes of converts who, with new faith, have also accepted a new lifestyle and everyday habits.

E. Mahieddin in his analysis, similar to the one from The Netherlands on undocumented migrants, discusses the self-projection and prayer from Pentecostal believers in “Swedish Jerusalem” whose projections of self are socially conditioned through their process of socialization. The so-called second modernity, in this view, appears to influence all spheres of social life, including the religious. However, Pentecostals do not only adapt to Swedishness but are also transforming it, and religion is, in this view, a resource for contestation.

A. Ploom’s chapter analyses the religious attitudes of Estonian women who have converted to Islam. This chapter clearly demonstrates the failure of both secularization and modernization theories because what applies to one does not necessarily apply to the other, but that does not mean that the latter is less modern. An in-depth analysis of the attitudes of Estonian women converts clearly demonstrates how female converts to Islam
combine their new faith with their ordinary, secular Estonian lives. While this study clearly demonstrates the role of the secular state (since Estonia is a highly secular state due to its Communist inheritance), it demonstrates even more the possibility of humans to act as agents capable of controlling their own lives and to self-reflect upon them while, at the same time, accepting the notion of religion in everyday life.

L. Moosavi wrote the following chapter in which he also deals with converts to Islam; however, this case study is from the UK. What appears in the British case is a sense of dual belonging and fostering of the national English identity after converting to Islam. In that, the English who have converted to Islam state they feel more British and more proud of their nation after the conversion due to the religious freedom they have in the UK. On the other hand, they see their conversion as a possibility to build bridges and increase mutual understanding and tolerance. This is the attitude of the majority; however, there is a minority that feels they cannot be fully British anymore due to the animosity toward Islam in the UK, and due to the fact that converts to Islam are seen as traitors. This analysis clearly demonstrates human self-reflexivity and agency in which Britons are converting to obtain another identity and then self-reflect on it and on the British society, to fully and independently observe the world.

The last part of the volume encompasses two chapters and deals with religion in the media, and this is also the title of this section. The first chapter is by C. Nardella and discusses the role of religion in the construction of the Turkish European identity in the Italian press with emphasis on the Pope’s visit to Turkey. The news coverage in Italy gave weight to two different imagined communities that implied a specific ideological “unity of us.” One imagined community is represented through the vision of the EU seen as a set of nations founded on Christian values, and this definition defines Europe, as opposed to Islam, seen as an external enemy. On the other hand, the EU is represented through the pluralized universe that considers Islam as an internal reality rather than an external issue. Religion is, for these discussions, a powerful discursive resource because it provides symbolism that represents anything but abstract and irrational systems of interests. In discussions on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, religion and culture bear the central role where religion clearly becomes a cultural element performing identity functions. Much of the discourse in the Italian press is placed on the history and remembrance, and less on the actual theology. This analysis clearly demonstrates the central role of religion in stereotyping and depicting the potential “other”; however, it also demonstrates the plurality of discourses present in the Italian media and society.
Finally, the last chapter, co-written by V. Cvetkovski-Ocokoljić, S. Sremac and T. Cvetkovska, offers an analysis of the Serbian media and the BBC, and the way they project Croatian and Serbian identities. Similar to the Italian case, this analysis also reveals how identities are projected through religion, in that Serbs are seen through Serbian Orthodoxy while Croats are seen through Catholicism. The latter is the case in the Serbian media, while in the case of the BBC these two countries are depicted through the conflict from the 1990s, candidacy for the EU membership, as well as Serbia’s ongoing dispute with Kosovo. In this sense, a dichotomy emerges. While Serbs stereotype and determine Croats as Catholics, ascribing to them collective, religious characteristics, the BBC clearly distinguishes and stereotypes according to the conflict with which it associates news from Serbia as newsworthy only when a conflict occurs. Looking into the way the Serbian media portrays Croats it appears that the predominant discourse is religiously founded and, therefore, the Serbian media contribute to the existing prejudices against the Croats with which they are not creating an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence, but rather create an atmosphere of stereotyping. On the other hand, British news coverage is associated with the secular nature of British society, for the BBC does not express interest in the religious affiliations of Serbs and Croats, but rather places the discussion on current political events and, to some extent, on former conflicts in the region; however, the BBC also contributes to stereotyping, though not in the religious sense.

References


—. (1999). “Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization.” *The